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Abstract
Resale price maintenance (RPM), slotting fees, loyalty rebates and
other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer
to transfer profits to retailers. If these retailers were to accommodate
entry, upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and
the breakdown of these profit transfers. Thus, in equilibrium, retailers
can internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent’s
profits. Consequently, if entry requires downstream accommodation,
entry can be deterred. We discuss policy implications of this aspect of
vertical contracting practices.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the upstream exclusionary effect of vertical practices
that create rents for downstream retailers without carrying a contractual
obligation for exclusivity.1 Examples of interest include allowing the manu-
facturer to set the price at which a retailer sells to consumers (RPM); periodic
lump-sum payments to retailers (through slotting fees or loyalty rebates); and
market division schemes (such as the allocation of clients to specific retailers
or the use of exclusive territories).
We explore equilibria that can arise when an upstream incumbent uses
a vertical practice of the sort outlined above to share industry profits with
retailers. We show that if entry by another upstream manufacturer leads
to competition that reduces industry profits sufficiently, and entry requires
accommodation by retailers, then equilibria exist in which retailers do not
accommodate the entrant. This results in exclusion. In essence, the vertical
practice creates a quasi-rent that retailers, in equilibrium, have an incentive
to protect.
Of the set of practices that we consider, resale price maintenance (RPM)
is currently among the most controversial. For almost one hundred years in
the U.S., following the Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Dr. Miles,2 use of
RPM was a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, though statutory
exemptions have existed at times (see Overstreet (1983) for a useful history
and for data on the use of RPM under these exemptions).3 The most cited
concern about RPM is that it facilitates retailer and manufacturer collusion,
by coordinating pricing and making monitoring easier (see Yamey (1954) and
Telser (1960) for early examples, and Shaffer (1991), Jullien and Rey (2007),
and Rey and Verge (2010) for formal treatments).
In 2007 the Supreme Court overturned the per se rule against RPM in
the Leegin case, in favor of a “rule of reason” approach.4 That is, courts are
now required to balance the potential efficiency benefits of RPM against the
1We are interested in contracting practices between upstream manufacturers and re-
tailers that would not trigger breach if a retailer were to serve more than one firm. Thus,
an exclusive dealing agreement would fall outside the scope of this paper.
2Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
3A per se violation means that the party bringing the case is not required to establish in
evidence that harm to competition occurred; instead, it is presumed by the mere existence
of the conduct. See Posner (2001, p.176ff).
4Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); the quote
below is at p.894.
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potential anti-competitive harm. In reaching this decision, the court relied
heavily on the pro-competitive theories of RPM that have been developed
in the economics literature.5 That said, in the majority decision, the court
noted a series of potential sources of competitive harm, including that:
A manufacturer with market power, by comparison, might use
resale price maintenance to give retailers an incentive not to sell
the products of smaller rivals or new entrants.
This paper provides a formal equilibrium foundation for this statement.6
Other vertical practices have raised similar anticompetitive concerns. For
instance, plaintiffs in the Intel case claimed that Intel used lump-sum rebates
that were contingent on the loyalty of hardware manufactures to Intel, in the
face of increased competitive pressure from AMD microprocessors.7 They
argued that these payments were, in effect, a ‘bribe’ to hardware manufac-
turers to help maintain Intel’s dominant position, with the threat being that
increased use of AMD microprocessors would result in the elimination of
these loyalty payments. In our framework, this threat is credible in that,
following entry, the equilibria we investigate are such that the upstream in-
cumbent has no incentive to offer such payments, and so downstream firms
would lose this rent stream following entry by another manufacturer. This
gives them an incentive to not accommodate the entrant.8 The LePage’s
case also involved a somewhat similar fact pattern.9
Many other vertical practices, such as slotting fees (discussed in Shaffer
(1991)) and market division schemes such as the use of exclusive territo-
ries, can be understood in our framework. We discuss how these and other
practices can lead to exclusionary outcomes.
5Prominent examples include Telser (1960), Marvel and McCafferty (1984), Klein and
Murphy (1988), Deneckere, Marvel, and Peck (1996, 1997), and Marvel (1994).
6For related literature in both law and economics, with examples, see Cassady (1939),
Yamey (1954), Bowman (1955) and the online appendix.
7State of New York v. Intel Corporation, drawing from the November 2009 com-
plaint of the New York Attorney General, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.
us/mediacenter/2009/nov/NYAGvIntelCOMPLAINTFINAL.pdf downloaded 29 November
2011. See Gans (forthcoming) for an overview of the Intel litigation.
8De Graba and Simpson (2010) discuss the Intel case in depth and propose a similar
(informal) theory of harm. Most of the other work on loyalty rebates does not consider
exclusion (see, for instance, Greenlee et al. (2008)), although exceptions include Marx and
Shaffer (2004), Ordover and Shaffer (2007), and Elhauge and Wickelgren (2012).
9See LePage’s v 3M, 324 F.3d 141.
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A related literature is that on naked exclusion arising from explicit exclu-
sive dealing arrangements (See Whinston (2006), Rey and Tirole (2007), and
Rey and Verge (2008) for useful overviews and earlier work by Rasmusen,
Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000) and Gans and King
(2002)). A recent strand of this literature considers the effect of competition
between retailers on upstream exclusion (in particular, Fumagalli and Motta
(2006), Wright (2009), Abito and Wright (2008), Simpson and Wickelgren
(2007) and Johnson (2011). In these papers, as in our paper, supplying a
single retailer can be enough to allow the entrant to supply all of the con-
sumer demand. The most important difference between the exclusive dealing
literature and this paper is that we consider exclusion arising from an equi-
librium understanding between an incumbent manufacturer and retailers, as
opposed to an explicit exclusivity clause in an enforceable contract. That
is, choosing to accommodate an entrant is not a breach of any contractual
term in our setting. Therefore, issues that arise in the literature—such as the
nature of damages in the event of contractual breach—are not relevant in our
environment. Given this, it is unsurprising that the equilibrium prevalence
of exclusion can be very different.
2 A baseline model
To model the exclusionary impact of vertical practices we begin with a gen-
eral approach in which rents are transferred lump-sum (the baseline model)
and then apply it to specific restraints. In the baseline model, two manu-
facturers produce competing goods. These manufacturers sell to consumers
via retailers. There are n ≥ 2 retailers in the market (n is fixed). Retail-
ers are perfect substitutes for each other, and their only marginal costs are
the wholesale prices that they pay to the manufacturers. One manufacturer
is already active in the market (the incumbent), and another is a potential
entrant (the entrant). There are infinitely many periods of competition. All
firms discount future profits with discount factor δ. Manufacturer and retailer
interactions, together with the timing of the game, are described below.
2.1 Timing
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which there are two types of
period (states), which we denote M (incumbent monopolist), and C (post-
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entry competition). The game begins in state M at t = 1. In this period,
the incumbent is active, but the potential entrant has yet to decide whether
or not to enter. The timing within a period begining in state M is as follows:
1. the incumbent sets a wholesale price, and gives a lump sum transfer
Ti ∈ [0,∞) to each retailer;10
2. retailers compete in prices and all profits are realized;
3. the entrant offers a transfer, T re ∈ [0,∞), to each retailer r, payable if
entry is accommodated;11,12
4. retailers simultaneously choose to accept (accommodate entry) or reject
the entrant’s offer;
5. if no retailer accommodates the entrant, the state in the next period
will continue to be M ; if at least one retailer accommodates, then the
entrant can choose either to pay the fixed cost, Fe, or not enter. Fe
is such that that an entrant, faced with a market with competition
(no exclusionary equilibria), will want to enter this market. The firm
commits to pay Fe in the current period (that is, it becomes sunk), but
the expense is incurred in the next.13 If the fixed cost is sunk, the state
then transitions to C, otherwise the state continues as M ;
A period beginning in state C is simpler—the incumbent and entrant
simultaneously set wholesale prices, and per-period lump-sum transfers14 and
then retailers compete in prices. C is an absorbing state.
The requirement that at least one retailer agree to carry the entrant’s
good for the entrant to become active (and for the state to switch from M
10Allowing the incumbent to discriminate between retailers would merely add notation.
11Requiring the entrant to make non-discriminatory offers to retailers would ease the
conditions for the existence of an exclusionary equilibrium since the entrant requires only
one retailer for accommodation, yet would need to make costly offers to all.
12Although we allow the entrant to offer different transfers to different retailers, we do
not allow these transfers to be contingent on the behavior of other retailers. Such offers
would allow the entrant to enter for free—analogous to the problem of bribing voters
considered in Dal Bo (2007): The entrant could make an offer along the lines of “I will
pay $1 trillion if you are the only retailer to let me enter” and then retailers would have a
weakly dominant strategy to accommodate entry. We thank a referee for this observation.
13This structure merely simplifies the discounting of cashflows.
14In principle, offers may differ between retailers; but, in equilibrium, they will not.
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to C) is crucial. The effect of such an agreement, which is effectively an
assurance of perpetual market access, is to guarantee competition between
the two manufacturers in all periods post-entry; in particular, it is assumed
that following entry, the incumbent remains in the market.15
The assumption of perpetual access is a reduced form for a number of
mechanisms that may generate an ongoing presence. This may simply be
the signing of an enforceable distribution contract.16 Or, it may be that
the retailer makes an un-modeled relationship specific investment, effectively
locking the retailer into providing access.
3 Analysis
We focus on and characterize stationary Markov Perfect Nash equilibria of the
game described in Section 2, where the state is the current market structure.
That is, the state space is the finite set {M,C}.17 We discuss the impact of
using alternative equilibrium criteria in Section 4.3.
In each state, active manufacturers set wholesale prices. The n ≥ 2 re-
tailers then take these prices as their marginal costs and compete in the
sale prices they charge to customers. Since retailers are perfect substitutes
for each other, competition among retailers will resemble Bertrand competi-
tion with homogenous firms (and common, constant, marginal costs). This
establishes the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In every state, retailer profits (ignoring transfers) are zero.
Standard assumptions on demand and costs and resulting properties of
profit functions allow us to abstract away from the details of pricing in the
stage game and work with manufacturer profits.18 We denote the incumbent’s
period-profit in the monopoly state, not counting any transfers Ti, as πMi .
15In state M the entrant remains as a potential threat (or gets replaced each period by
another identical entrant). Interestingly, an entrant might find it easier to gain entry if it
could credibly commit to disappear in the future if it is not accommodated today, as the
ongoing threat of entry is necessary for retailers to obtain rents from the incumbent.
16If the contract’s duration is limited, this will (if anything) make exclusion easier.
17Since this paper is not about ‘standard’ collusion, the specified state space rules out
collusion between firms post-entry. It also removes the possibility of coordination via usual
repeated game strategies between retailers pre-entry.
18Where we use first order conditions, we assume differentiability and quasi-concavity.
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Equivalently, πMi denotes industry profits prior to entry. If the entrant is in
the market, the incumbent’s profit is πCi < πMi and the entrant’s is πCe .
Key to the mechanics of the model is the observation that, since C is an
absorbing state, there is no reason for a manufacturer to give a lump-sum
transfer to any retailer in the C state. Such transfers have no effect on the
quantity purchased or on the evolution of the state, and so any such transfer
would violate profit maximization on the part of the manufacturer. While
unsurprising, this is sufficiently important that we state it as a lemma.
Lemma 2 Transfers from manufacturers to retailers will not occur following
entry (i.e. in the C state).
Given this characterization of profits, and play in the C state, we can
turn to characterizing the full game. Our interest is in characterizing when
exclusion is possible in equilibrium. However, there are always equilibria
with no exclusion. We illustrate an example of a no-exclusion equilibrium in
Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 3 There is always an equilibrium in which entry takes place and the
entrant offers T re = 0 to every retailer.
Proof. Consider a period in which the state is M . Suppose that the entrant
offers T re = 0 to every retailer. Consider that part of the period in which
retailers simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject the entrant’s offers.
If one retailer accepts the entrant’s offer, then the best response set of all
other retailers will also include acceptance. This is because acceptance by
one retailer ensures that entry occurs. Thus, the state changes and the payoff
to a retailer is the same regardless of whether it accepts or rejects. Hence,
accept is in the best response set.
Given this set of strategies on the part of the retailers, T re = 0 is optimal
for the entrant.
We now turn to the necessary and sufficient conditions for an exclusionary
equilibrium to exist. By exclusionary, we mean an equilibrium in which the
retailers never accommodate entry.
Proposition 1 An exclusionary equilibrium (one in which the entrant does
not enter) exists if and only if
πMi − πCi
n (1− δ) ≥
πCe
1− δ − Fe (1)
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Proof. Given that all other retailers choose not to accommodate, retailer
r will not accommodate if the return to accommodation is weakly less than
the return from refusing. That is, following Lemmas 1 and 2, if
δTi
1− δ ≥ T
r
e
The rest of the proof proceeds by examining the maximal values of Ti and
T re , denoted T i and T e, respectively, that are individually rational for the
incumbent and entrant at stage 1 and stage 3 in state M , respectively. If the
discounted value of the flow of T i is greater than T e, then an exclusionary
equilibrium must exist. If not, then for every per-period transfer Ti, the
entrant can offer some T re to retailer r, that will induce that retailer to
accommodate entry (and offer no transfers to any other retailer so as to
minimize expenditure).
An entrant gets zero profit if it does not enter. Hence, T e is such that
the entrant’s ex ante profits from entering the market is zero. That is,
T e =
δπCe
1− δ − δFe (2)
The incumbent will be willing to set Ti such that profits without entry
less total per-period transfers, are at least as large as what would be gained
from simply allowing entry. That is,
πMi − nTi ≥ πCi (3)
Given this, the maximal per-period transfer to an individual retailer is
T i =
πMi − πCi
n
(4)
Setting T i/ (1− δ) ≥ T e demonstrates that the condition is necessary.
To observe that it is also sufficient, note that the entrant could offer T e to
one of the retailers (and nothing to any of the others).
The condition for the existence of an exclusionary equilibrium, Condition
(1), is similar to the standard condition for sustainable price collusion (among
retailers) using grim trigger strategies; the left-hand-side is analogous to the
firm’s pay-off from cooperating in a cartel, and the right-hand-side is analo-
gous to the deviation payoff (where the punishment payoff is zero). In this
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sense, the per-period transfer Ti from the incumbent to the retailers creates
an incentive to coordinate on market structure, in that accommodating an
entrant (deviating from the ‘cartel’) carries with it a punishment in terms of
the lost share of industry profits (the transfer Ti).
Note that Proposition 1 allows for both product differentiation and cost
heterogeneity at the manufacturer level; however, retailers are assumed to be
perfect substitutes for expositional ease.
If the fixed cost of entry is equal to zero, then Condition (1) reduces to
πMi − πCi
n
≥ πCe (5)
implying that, in the absence of fixed costs, the discount rate is not important
in determining whether exclusionary equilibria are possible in this model.
Following Lemma 3 and Proposition 1, it is immediate that if Condi-
tion (1) holds then both an exclusionary equilibrium and an accommodating
equilibrium can coexist. However, there is a sense in which the exclusionary
equilibrium is more appealing: in the accommodating equilibrium of Lemma
3 no retailer earns profits and the incumbent is worse off with the presence
of the entrant as a competitive threat; by comparison, in the equilibrium of
Proposition 1, retailers earn profits and the incumbent is better off.
4 Applications to specific vertical practices
In this section we discuss the application of the baseline model to specific ver-
tical practices. Lump-sum schemes (like loyalty payments and slotting fees)
are captured directly by the baseline model. Hence, we turn our attention
to schemes based on pricing restraints (using resale price maintenance as an
example), and market division schemes (such as exclusive sales territories).
While we retain our focus on the case of upstream exclusion, we note that
the same mechanisms could arise from dominant downstream firm sharing
rents with upstream suppliers to exclude a downstream rival.19
19This point mirrors the discussion of Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S.
208 (1939) in Krattenmaker and Salop (1986). The Leegin decision also raises the issue.
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4.1 Resale price maintenance
The application of the baseline model to RPM requires more detailed expo-
sition. The issue is that, because RPM is a pricing restraint, pricing needs
to be modeled explicitly. For expositional ease, we restrict the model so that
the entrant and the incumbent sell identical products. We let marginal costs
be constant, with ci and ce being the incumbent’s and entrant’s costs, re-
spectively, and ci ≥ ce. We suppose that q(p) denotes industry demand at
price p. Lastly, we set the fixed cost of entry equal to zero.20,21
Rather than offering a lump-sum transfer each period, the incumbent
sets a wholesale price and a retail price.22 The retail margin that this creates
generates the rent transfer that is captured by Ti in the baseline model. Thus,
the retailers enjoy a rent transfer equal to their margin (created by shutting
down competition between them) multiplied by their share of the market.23
This is the central observation that allows the insight in the baseline model
to be transferred to the RPM case.
Formally, we adapt the model so as to preclude the incumbent and the
entrant in state C from offering lump-sum transfers but instead allow them
to dictate the retail price, in addition to setting the wholesale price.24 We
say that a manufacturer imposes RPM if the retail price is different from the
one that retailers would adopt if they were to face only the wholesale price.
Consider the C state:
Lemma 4 Retailers and the incumbent make zero profits following entry
(i.e., in the C state). The entrant’s period profit is given by πCe = (ci −
ce)q(ce).
Proof. Much like Lemma 1, this lemma follows from the observation that
manufacturer and retailer choices mirror Bertrand price competition with
20For variations on this RPM model with non-zero fixed costs and product differentiation
see Asker and Bar-Isaac (2010). Note that varying upstream or downstream differentiation
affects all of πMi , πCi and πCe , so a non-monotonic effect can occur.
21Note that RPM can arise through the combination of other restraints: see Johnson’s
(2012) example combining agency and MFN clauses.
22Since retailers compete via Bertrand, this need only be a minimum retail price.
23Given that retailers are perfect substitutes, we adopt the standard assumption and let
them split the market equally if they are selling at the same price.
24We re-express point 1. in the timing of state M and state C, and leave the rest
unaltered: 1. becomes, ‘the incumbent sets a wholesale price and a retail price;’; and.
state C. becomes, ‘the incumbent and entrant set a wholesale price and retail price each;
then retailers compete in prices.’
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homogenous goods. That πCe = (ci−ce)q(ce) follows from the usual argument
for Bertrand with asymmetric costs.
Following the logic in the baseline case, the fact that πCe = (ci − ce)q(ce)
implies the maximal transfer, Te, is such that Te = (ci − ce)q(ce)/(1 − δ).
Further, since πCi = 0, the incumbent will be indifferent between transferring
all the rents from excluding the entrant to retailers and allowing entry to
occur. Thus, if RPM is being used to transfer rents, the maximal rent transfer
can be implemented by setting the wholesale price equal to the incumbent’s
marginal cost and the retail price equal to the monopoly price. We assume
that, with equal retail prices, retailers split the market equally, so Ti = πMi /n.
Hence, having calculated Ti and Te, the condition for the existence of an
exclusionary equilibrium (analogous to equation 1) in this simplified RPM
setting is:25
πMi
n
≥ (ci − ce)q(ce), (6)
indicating that it is possible for an incumbent to use RPM to exclude a lower
cost rival from a market. Note that in this case πCi = 0 and πCe = (ci−ce)q(ce)
so that Equation (6) is identical to Equation (1). As before, if the inequality is
strong, it is possible for the incumbent to earn positive profits while having
the entrant excluded. Thus, this RPM example is an application of the
baseline model.
4.2 Exclusive sales territories and quantity restrictions
Manufacturers may also limit competition between retailers by such methods
as limiting the quantity that retailers can sell or by defining exclusive sales
territories for retailers. Vertical practices of this form can also diminish com-
petition between retailers and so create rents that give retailers an incentive
not to accommodate entry.
Consider the case of exclusive territories that each of two retailers can
serve equally easily.26 If the incumbent manufacturer granted (equally-sized)
25Due to the absence of a fixed cost, the 1/(1− δ) term cancels out.
26The game’s timing is adjusted such that 1. in state M and state C become, respec-
tively, ‘the incumbent sets a wholesale price and (if desired) exclusive sales territories;
otherwise,’; and. ‘the incumbent and entrant set a wholesale price and and (if desired)
exclusive sales territories each, then retailers compete in prices.’
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exclusive territories to the two retailers and priced at his (constant) marginal
cost, then each retailer would set a price equal to the monopoly price, so that
the maximum that the incumbent can transfer to each retailer per-period
would be πMi /n where n = 2.
Following entry, suppose the incumbent maintains the exclusive territo-
ries. The entrant would prefer to have both retailers serving both territories
and have the retailers undercut the retail price of the incumbent’s retailer.
As a result, the familiar Bertrand style arguments lead to the exclusive terri-
tories dissolving in the post-entry equilibrium and, if the manufacturers sell
homogeneous goods, Lemma 4 applies, and Condition (6) again is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of an exclusionary equilibrium.
4.3 Alternative post-entry equilibria
The Markov Perfect solution concept, together with the definition of the
state space, selects a particular equilibrium in the C-state: that equilibrium
resembling the static Nash solution. It may be that, in certain instances,
some other form of equilibrium is more compelling (most likely resembling
some form of coordinated effects, or repeated game, equilibrium). This would
change the post-entry payoffs πCe and πCi in Proposition 1. It is easy to show
that the basic intuitions are preserved with different forms of post-entry
conduct, although, depending on the post-entry equilibrium of interest, the
algebra can become cumbersome. More interestingly, even if the manufac-
turers could collude post-entry, the incumbent (and the retail sector) may
still be better off in an exclusionary equilibrium as the entrant, by virtue
of having a cost advantage, may need to capture most of the cartel profits
to make collusion sustainable. The online appendix works through several
alternative post-entry equilibria.
5 Policy implications
At the heart of this paper is a familiar intuition: Each vertical practice
we consider allows retailers to capture a portion of the industry rents that
the market power of the incumbent generates. Indeed, it is precisely these
quasi-rents (and the threat of losing them) that have been used to provide a
pro-competitive theory of vertical practices: Klein and Murphy (1988) argue
that manufacturers can use these quasi-rents to entice retailers to provide
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the desired level of service. However, here, we highlight a more harmful
implication of such quasi-rents.27 If an entrant cannot establish itself without
some retailer support, then retailers may be hesitant to accommodate an
entrant since more competition upstream will reduce industry rents, and,
hence, the quasi-rents enjoyed by retailers.28 In effect, the service that the
retailers provide is the exclusion of a potential entrant. Therefore, according
to this theory, both the retail sector and the incumbent manufacturer can
gain from these exclusionary practices.29
The harm caused by the exclusionary behavior is easiest seen in the con-
text of the homogenous good model used to discuss RPM (section 4.1). Ex-
clusion decreases consumer welfare, creating the standard lost gains from
trade due to monopoly, and also can deprive the economy of a lower cost
producer leading to productive inefficiency. Where, as in the baseline model,
goods can be differentiated, we may also see inefficiency arising from distor-
tions to consumers’ choice sets.
This potential harm is of more than theoretical interest. The U.S. Supreme
Court raised concerns about foreclosure arising from RPM in the Leegin case,
as discussed in the introduction, and the E.U. Guidelines on Vertical Re-
straints also address this issue.30,31 Moreover, these concerns have been noted
in earlier literature (notably Cassady, 1939; Yamey, 1954 and 1966; Bowman,
1955 and others discussed in the online appendix). One well-documented
case where alternative theories (for example, service provision, or coordi-
nating collusion) are difficult to support is the American Sugar Trust (see
Zerbe, 1969, Marvel and McCafferty, 1985, and Genesove and Mullin, 2006)
which operated in the 1890s. In this case a homogenous good (sugar) was
supplied by a monopolist to wholesale grocers who then sold it to retailers.
27See also Shaffer (1991), in the context of restraints facilitating retailer collusion.
28Comanor and Rey (2001) make a related point in the context of exclusive dealing.
Similarly, Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) make references to a closely related mechanism
in their discussion of the “Cartel Ringmaster” (pp. 238-240 and in footnote 71).
29Consistent with this observation, Overstreet (1983, p.145ff) describes lobbying by
both manufacturers and retailers for the ‘Fair-Trade’ statutes that created exemptions
from liability for RPM in the middle of the last century.
30“[R]esale price maintenance may be implemented by a manufacturer with market power
to foreclose smaller rivals” (E.U. Vertical Guidelines p.64, paragraph 224).
31While vertical agreements are often considered under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
(Article 101 for the E.U.), the model here is one of monopolization, suggesting possible
Section 2 (Article 102) liability. See Hemphill and Wu (2012) for a related discussion of
liability in the context of joint action by a group of manufacturers.
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The Wholesale Grocers Association suggested an RPM arrangement to the
Sugar Trust, which was framed as a profit sharing arrangement to ensure the
exclusion of a rival manufacturer. This set of facts provides a challenge to
service arguments, in that it is difficult to see what consumer service a prod-
uct like sugar requires and the RPM program did not appear to be designed
to facilitate collusion. We provide further examples in the online appendix.
Our theory makes three broad contributions to policy: first, by giving
rigorous foundation to ill-defined foreclosure concerns; second, by providing
guidance as to screens or criteria to assess the effect of vertical restraints; and
third, by providing a structured way to assess the liability of, and damages
caused by, a firm engaged in exclusion. We discuss each in turn.
First, providing a rigorous foundation for exclusionary concerns gives a
common framework for addressing policy debates across different vertical
practices and provides some justification for increasing attention on the issue.
Despite early historical accounts of the exclusionary effects of various ver-
tical practices, policy discussion of exclusion has been somewhat foreclosed
by concerns about coordination on prices. For example, the OFT’s submis-
sion to the OECD (2008) roundtable on RPM does not address exclusion
as a cause of harm in outlining economic theories (pp. 204-207); nor does
the United States’ submission in its review of theories of anti-competitive
uses (pp.218-9), and, more generally, there is no mention of exclusion in the
300-page OECD report.
Meanwhile, the development of a common framework may assist in the
development of judicial approaches to exclusion and vertical restraints. Ju-
dicial reasoning has tended to focus on restraints on a piecemeal basis rather
than adopting a unified approach. In the U.S. this is perhaps most appar-
ent in the pre-Leegin period following the Sylvania decision.32 During this
period, cases regarding non-price restraints were evaluated under the ‘rule
of reason’, while RPM cases continued to be treated as ‘per se violations.33
Even now, the judicial approach to evaluating the harm arising from these
different restraints is, at best, unclear. The framework developed in this pa-
per suggests that, at least as far as concerns about exclusion are concerned,
a more consolidated approach is both feasible and supported by economic
theory.34
32Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
33Albeit tempered by the exceptions arising from U.S. v. Colgate 250 U.S. 200 (1919).
34Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) offered a unified approach to the evaluation of explic-
itly exclusive agreements (such as exclusive dealing).
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Second, the framework developed in this paper suggests a series of screens
for determining whether an agreement gives rise to an exclusionary equilib-
rium. First, it must be necessary that effective entry requires the accommo-
dation of at least one retailer. That is, it should be prohibitively difficult for
an entrant to compete meaningfully with an incumbent without the services
of a retailer that enjoys quasi-rents. This would be violated if, for instance,
an entrant could be vertically integrated or, equivalently, there were free en-
try of retailers. Second, if entry were to occur, industry profit should be
diminished by competition. (The most obvious condition for this to be true
is that the incumbent would continue to exert competitive pressure in the
market for at least some significant time following entry.) Third, it must be
that the quasi-rents enjoyed by the retailers would diminish in the event of
entry. Finally, an immediate implication of the model is that, all things being
equal, adding an extra retailer makes exclusion harder. This last observation
also suggests a complementarity between upstream and downstream exclu-
sion: An upstream monopolist hoping to prevent a rival’s entry can gain
from downstream exclusion insofar as this reduces the number of firms that
he has to pay off to ensure upstream exclusion.35
These screens ignore which party initially suggests the restraint. This
is most relevant in current discussion surrounding RPM. In the framework
presented in this paper both the incumbent manufacturer and retailers stand
to gain from RPM, and either side might initiate RPM for the purpose of ex-
clusion. Bowman (1955), in particular, provides examples of both upstream
and downstream firms initiating RPM. This contrasts with suggestions from
policy makers and commentators who have suggested that antitrust author-
ities should distinguish between manufacturer- and retailer-initiated RPM.
For example, the Leegin ruling (p.898), citing Posner (2001), states:
It makes all the difference whether minimum retail prices are
imposed by the manufacturers in order to evoke point-of-sale ser-
vices or by the dealers in order to obtain monopoly profits.
Our framework suggests that using the identity of the initiating party is not
informative, at least as far as any exclusionary concern is concerned.36
35These screens can be recast as comparative statics of the baseline model. The prim-
itives of that model are the profits and the number of retailers. Adding structure appro-
priate to the empirical setting (e.g articulating how a marginal cost shock or new product
introduction affects the profits), would allow for testing of these comparative statics.
36If parties can make side-payments to each other, the screen is uninformative in every
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A persistent challenge in determining liability in cases involving vertical
restraints is how to reconcile the pro-competitive benefits of service provi-
sion with the anti-competitive effects of exclusion (setting aside any collusive
impact). This challenge is compounded by the observation that the service
provision by retailers may be the very thing that makes the monopoly profits
large enough to make exclusion feasible: service shifts demand outward, in-
creasing industry profits and, thereby, increasing retailers’ quasi-rents in an
exclusionary equilibrium.
Our framework suggests a potential path through this quagmire. For
exclusion to occur in our framework, competition post-entry should diminish
the quasi-rents enjoyed by retailers. Hence, if the restraint can credibly
be claimed to disappear in the event of entry, this might suggest that the
restraint is exclusionary.
At this point, to the extent that the elimination of the restraint is as-
sociated with lower service, there remains a trade-off similar to the familiar
Williamson (1968) trade-off applied to mergers. Restricting ourselves to a
homogenous good environment with constant marginal costs the trade-off is
as follows. First, the restraint introduces a productive inefficiency caused by
excluding a more efficient producer. Second, if the monopoly quantity is less
than the post-entry quantity sold, then there is a welfare gain on the infra-
marginal units for which service has been increased by the restraint, and a
loss on the marginal units that would have been supplied post-entry. If the
monopoly quantity is greater than that sold post entry, then there is only a
welfare gain, from more goods being sold and an increase in service provi-
sion. The relative size of these effects determines the desirability of exclusion
from a total welfare point of view, analogous to the analysis conducted by
Wiliamson. Importantly, and in contrast to Williamson, a criterion focused
on consumer welfare does not appear to lend itself to a sufficient statistic
approach (in Williamson’s framework a price rise is sufficient for consumer
harm). When considering vertical restraints and exclusion, a drop in price
may still signal a consumer welfare loss if the service provision is sufficiently
valuable.
Given this, at the very least, a defendant should bear a significant burden
in raising a defense based on service . As has been argued with regard to
efficiencies in merger analysis (e.g. Williamson (1968) and Turner (1965)),
context: a manufacturer may suggest a restraint to retailers to aid cartel coordination, in
return for a cut of cartel profits. We attribute this observation to Joe Farrell.
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the firm is in the best position to produce evidence on this point, and, if it
is important, one would presume the consideration of service formed part of
the analysis accompanying the establishment of the restraint.
Third, once the screens are satisfied and the potential for an exclusion-
ary effect appears to deserve serious consideration, the framework gives a
basis for the evaluation of the trade-offs outlined above, and the assessment
of damages. The model we present is sufficiently simple to be capable of
estimation using structural econometric tools now standard in the empir-
ical I.O. literature (see Davis (2009) for a treatment focused on antitrust
applications).
A final issue in evaluating the impact of a vertical restraint is its role in the
presence of other restraints. A particular issue, with respect to the framework
presented in this paper, is how it should be viewed when explicit exclusivity
provisions exist in an enforceable contract. In practice, one might consider
exclusivity provisions as giving explicit form to the agreement and, possi-
bly, helping to coordinate the equilibrium, while the practices we consider
may implicitly reinforce the explicit terms, especially in the face of uncertain
enforceability of an exclusivity provision. To this extent, one might view
RPM (or any other practice we consider) and exclusive dealing as being, in
some instances, complementary exclusionary devices. This suggests that be-
havioral remedies prohibiting exclusive dealing contracts, but not addressing
the implicit form provided by other practices, may have limited effectiveness.
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